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Abstract 
Standard practice is to benchmark managerial performance against best observed practice, 
because engineering information is rarely available. We exploit a rare opportunity to benchmark 
managerial performance against engineering standards. Our managerial performance describes 
the activities of Spanish electricity distributors, and our engineering standards are obtained from 
an engineering grid created by an international consultancy. We find the consultancy's network to 
be much less costly to operate. When we decompose the cost differential, we find that the 
superior network design, combined with lower input prices, accounts for more than all of the 
predicted cost savings. However we also find that the managers are more cost efficient than the 
consultancy, presumably because they exploit their incentive to be cost efficient under a revenue 
cap regulatory regime. 
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The Managers versus the Consultants* 
I. Introduction 
Variants of revenue cap regulation of monopoly utilities are in use or under consideration 
in a growing number of countries. The motive is to provide utilities with an incentive to reduce 
cost through improvements in efficiency and productivity, and to provide regulators with the 
ability to force utilities to share the benefits with consumers.  
The most challenging part of the exercise is the determination of the performance offset X 
in the revenue cap formula RPI - X, where RPI is a retail price index. In some countries a linear 
programming technique known as data envelopment analysis (DEA) has been used to benchmark 
the performance of the regulated utilities against best practice standards. DEA thus allows the 
regulator to implement a sort of yardstick competition when actual competition is missing. In this 
way DEA can assist the regulator in the determination of the performance offset X.1 Kittelsen 
(1999) and Agrell and Bogetoft (2001) have argued that regulators should use DEA to assist in 
the determination of revenue caps in a wide set of circumstances. They demonstrate that DEA-
based yardstick competition can provide performance incentives to utilities, and also can provide 
the regulator with the ability to capture part of the rents arising from information asymmetries 
that would otherwise accrue to the utilities. 
An equally challenging part of the exercise is the determination of best practice standards. 
The theoretical benefits of DEA-based yardstick competition notwithstanding, in practice the use 
of DEA has been hindered in many jurisdictions by small sample sizes caused by a small (and 
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declining) number of regulated utilities. The typical remedy has been to add overseas utilities to 
the domestic sample, both to expand the sample size and to provide potential benchmarks. The 
drawback of this practice is that overseas utilities are structured differently, operate in different 
regulatory environments, and so are rarely comparable.2 
The second challenge confronts the Spanish regulator. Spain has nine regulated electricity 
distributors, an insufficient number with which to implement yardstick competition. 
Consequently the regulator has commissioned an international consultancy to validate a proposed 
ideal (“referencia”) engineering network. The network is very detailed, technologically and 
geographically, and enables the regulator to replace inappropriate overseas distributors with a 
domestic benchmark network specifically tailored to the structure of Spanish electricity demand. 
This in turn enables the regulator to monitor performance and set tariffs without recourse to the 
use of controversial overseas benchmarks.3 
The existence of an engineering network raises the question of how good it really is. Our 
objective is to use DEA, not in an ex ante attempt to determine X, but in an ex post comparison 
of the performance of the distributors with that of the consultancy's ideal network. Our strategy is 
to benchmark the actual performance of the existing distribution network against the potential 
performance of the ideal network designed by the consultancy and adopted by the regulator. We 
measure performance in terms of the operating cost incurred in meeting electricity demand. We 
decompose the cost differential into three components in an effort to identify the sources of the 
cost differential. The first component is a network design differential, which we expect to favor 
the consultancy's more modern network. The second component is an input price differential, 
which we also expect to favor the consultancy's network. The third component is a cost 
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efficiency differential, for which we have no expectation. This exercise provides us with an 
unusual opportunity to benchmark actual performance, not against typical “best practice” 
standards established in a predetermined sample of actual producers, but against ideal 
engineering standards established by an international consultancy. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide some background on 
the regulation of electricity distribution in Spain. In Section 3 we describe our two data sets. One 
consists of actual observations on the activities of the distributors in 1996. The other consists of 
hypothetical observations designed by the consultancy. In Section 4 we propose an economically 
informative decomposition of the cost differential between the actual distribution network and 
the ideal network proposed by the consultancy. In Section 5 we show how to implement the 
decomposition, using DEA. Section 6 summarizes our empirical findings. Briefly, we find the 
network design differential and the input price differential, both of which favor the consultancy’s 
ideal network, to be partially offset by the cost efficiency differential, which favors the 
incumbent managers who exploit their incentive to control costs. Section 7 concludes. 
II.  Background 
Prior to 1998 each of Spain's nine regional electricity distributors was vertically integrated 
between generation and distribution. Following disintegration, six of these companies formed a 
single group (Endesa), leaving just four independent distributors. The market is heavily 
concentrated, with the Endesa group and one of the companies (Iberdrola) controlling over 80% 
of electricity distribution.4 
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Beginning in 1987 distributors’ tariffs and their capital investment plans were governed by 
the Marco Legal Estable (MLE). Under this decree distributors’ revenues were determined by 
their allowed “standard costs." Tariffs were determined by dividing aggregate standard costs by 
expected demand. This system has worked somewhat like a revenue cap system, since it gave 
distributors the incentive to reduce their actual costs. The main difference between this system 
and conventional RPI-X regulation is that, although standard costs have been adjusted upward to 
account for inflation, they appear not to have been adjusted downward to reflect cost-reducing 
productivity gains. Moreover, the high level of concentration in the industry, combined with the 
distributors’ financial and political influence, has limited the ability of the regulator to implement 
anything like yardstick competition. Thus the considerable benefits of productivity gains realized 
over more than a decade have been retained by the companies, rather than shared with 
consumers. 
Consequently in 1994 a law (LOSEN) was passed creating a new regulatory body (CSEN), 
whose main charge was to protect consumer interests and to guarantee transparency of the 
regulatory process. CSEN planned to overhaul the system of regulation, since the MLE remained 
in effect but had not been updated since 1987. In order to obtain requisite technological and 
financial information, CSEN sent a questionnaire to all distributors and monitored compliance. 
The resulting information is contained in an internal CSEN document known as ATLAS, which 
provides a detailed summary of the distribution network in 1996. At the same time the Ministerio 
de Industria was considering a rationalization of both the structure of the network and the 
standard cost framework by which distributor revenues were determined. The idea seems to have 
originated with one of the distributors, Hidroeléctrica del Cantábrico, which proposed an ideal 
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network to the Ministerio and the other distributors. The Ministerio then commissioned an 
international consultancy to validate the feasibility of the ideal network. The motivation of the 
Ministerio was apparently the same as that of CSEN, to update the decade-old RPI-0 regulatory 
system. The Ministerio and the distributors have met periodically since then, in an ongoing effort 
to reach a final agreement concerning both the structure of the ideal network and a revision of the 
standard cost framework on which distributors’ revenues are determined.5 
In 1997 another law, “Ley 54/97 del Sector Electrico,” was enacted to introduce 
competition into electricity generation and to dismantle the vertical integration of the distributors. 
It also recognized the consultancy's ideal network as a benchmark with which to regulate 
electricity distribution. This ideal network considered the structure of demand as being 
exogenously determined, its structure being governed by location, peak demand and type of 
voltage required. On this basis it proposed both an ideal network incorporating a high level of 
service quality, and a set of ideal input prices. The reason it proposed ideal input prices is that 
they are required to adjust the standard cost framework in order to set revised revenue caps. 
The consultancy's ideal network has been controversial, and alternatives have been 
proposed by the distributor Unión Eléctrica Fenosa and by the Endesa group. The distributor 
Iberdrola claims that regulation using any ideal network presents such difficulties that it is better 
to reform the old revenue cap system, in the belief that any such network would be unfair to 
urban distributors and infeasible in light of environmental and zoning restrictions. This 
controversy has impeded the regulatory use of the ideal network ever since its adoption after the 
passage of the 1997 law. The consequence of this lack of agreement is that the regulator is using 
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it, but in an unclear way. Nonetheless it has made Spain a pioneering country in regulating 
electricity distribution using an engineering benchmark grid rather than yardstick competition.6 
As a consequence of this chain of events, we have access to a pair of data sets. One is 
contained in ATLAS, and describes the network as it existed in 1996. The other describes the 
consultancy’s ideal engineering network. The former is the result of many years of managerial 
decisions based on growth in demand, a concomitant increase in market power, and continuing 
regulation based on economic incentives. The latter is the result of the consultancy's effort to 
design an ideal network from scratch, in light of current technology and current and projected 
future demand. The two differ substantially. 
III.  The Two Data Sets 
Our actual data set describes the 1996 operations of nine distributors, each of which 
operates in one or more of 47 provinces. Allocating distributor operations to provinces generates 
a total of 68 distributor/province observations on which we base our analysis. We have excluded 
the island provinces of Canarias and Baleares, and we have deleted one atypical mainland 
distributor/province observation (Unión Eléctrica Fenosa’s facility in the province of Lugo) 
because it provides electricity primarily to a single large aluminium producer, and its initial 
inclusion distorted the empirical results. 
The data were provided to us by CSEN. The primary data source is ATLAS, which 
contains information on inputs and outputs at the distributor/province level. Additional detailed 
information concerning high voltage lines and substations was derived from alternative sources 
made available by CSEN. Service reliability information was obtained from the distributors' trade 
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association. Finally, MLE contains information used to derive actual input prices. Based on 
consultations with CSEN, our variable list contains five outputs and five inputs. In order to 
conserve on degrees of freedom, several of these variables have been aggregated from more 
detailed information provided by CSEN. We first define the variables in general terms, and we 
then describe how the actual variables differ from the consultancy’s ideal variables. 
Outputs:  low voltage electricity customers (#) 
medium and high voltage electricity customers (#)  
service territory area (km2) 
low, medium and high voltage electricity distributed (GWh) 
service reliability [low and medium voltage electricity distributed (MWh) /  
low and medium voltage electricity lost to unplanned interruptions (MWh)] 
Inputs:    low voltage (< 0.38 KV) lines (km) 
medium voltage ([0.38 KV, 36 KV]) lines (km) 
high voltage ([36 KV, 132 KV]) lines (km) 
substation transformer capacity from high voltage to high and medium voltage, 
and from medium voltage to medium voltage (MVA) 
substation transformer capacity from medium voltage to low voltage (MVA) 
The variable list is fairly conventional, although the inclusion of service territory area and 
service reliability among the outputs, and the disaggregation of the line and transformer capacity 
inputs, makes it more detailed than most variable lists.7 The list does not contain a labor input, 
because labor expenses are embedded in the operating cost of the other inputs. 
Actual and ideal outputs are the same, in both definition and magnitude. Actual inputs are 
available in ATLAS at the distributor/province level. Ideal inputs were calculated at the 
municipality and industrial area level, based on various indicators of electricity demand, and 
aggregated to the distributor/province level. 
The MLE provides a framework for reimbursement based on an allowed “standard cost” for 
distributing high, medium and low voltage electricity. This is the only available source of 
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operating cost information for the distribution of electricity. Since the framework has not been 
updated since 1987, the standard cost allowance probably overstates actual operating cost.  
Our procedure for deriving actual input prices involves four steps, established in 
cooperation with CSEN. We first allocate standard operating cost associated with the distribution 
of medium and low voltage electricity from the distributor level to the distributor/province level, 
in the proportion of each activity accounted for by each province. We then allocate standard 
operating cost associated with the distribution of medium and low voltage electricity to the inputs 
associated with each activity, using cost allocation procedures developed in cooperation with 
CSEN. Once standard operating cost has been allocated to each input at the distributor/province 
level, we derive actual input prices by dividing input allocations by input quantities. These three 
steps generate distributor/province level prices for low voltage lines, medium voltage lines and 
substation transformer capacity from medium voltage to low voltage. Finally, we generate 
distributor/province level prices for the two remaining inputs from actual information on high 
voltage lines and high voltage substations. This information exists at the micro level, and does 
not have to be allocated from the distributor level to the distributor/province level. 
The consultancy’s ideal input prices are determined quite differently, from more detailed 
information. Their procedure begins with three types of operating cost: maintenance, repair and 
preparedness. Each includes labor cost, and each is defined at municipality or industrial areas. 
The first two cost components are defined on a per-unit basis for each input, and must be 
aggregated to the distributor/province level based on the ideal input vectors. The third cost 
component is defined at the distributor/province level, and must be allocated to inputs based on 
their expected failure frequencies. All three cost components vary across provinces, which have 
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different operating environments. Once the first two cost components have been aggregated to 
the distributor/province level, and the third cost component has been allocated to inputs, ideal 
expenditure on each input is divided by ideal input quantities to derive ideal input prices. 
The two data sets are summarized, for the nine distributors rather than for all 68 
distributor/province observations, in Tables 1 - 3. Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the enormous size 
disparity among the distributors, as well as the dominance of the Endesa group (CSE, ENHER, 
ERZ, EV, FECSA and HECSA) and Iberdrola. Table 2 illustrates the difference between the 
actual network and the consultancy’s ideal network. Aggregate resource use is lower for all five 
inputs in the consultancy’s network. In only six instances does the consultancy recommend an 
increased use of a particular input.8 Table 3 illustrates the difference between actual input prices 
and those proposed by the consultancy. The consultancy recommends average decreases in three 
input prices, and average increases in the prices of MV and HV lines. The pattern of 
recommended price changes is generally consistent across distributors, although there are a few 
exceptions.  
In conjunction with the consultancy’s smaller ideal network, its ideal input price structure 
implies that its ideal operating cost is 28% lower than the actual operating cost. Adoption of the 
consultancy's recommendations would have generated operating cost savings of nearly 300 
million euros.9 
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IV. The Analytical Framework 
Let x = (x1,…,xN) ≥ 0 be a vector of inputs used in the production of a vector of outputs y = 
(y1,…,yM) ≥ 0, and let w = (w1,…,wN) > 0 be a vector of input prices. Cost is then wTx ≥ c(y,w), 
where c(y,w) is a cost frontier characterizing the minimum cost required to produce outputs y 
when input prices are w. 
We designate the actual situation confronted by the managers with superscript “o” and the 
benchmark situation designed by the consultancy with superscript “*”. Then woTxo ≥ co(y,wo) and 
w*Tx* ≥ c*(y,w*), where co(y,wo) embodies the actual network and input prices and c*(y,w*) 
embodies the consultancy's ideal network and input prices. 
In addition to the two cost frontiers co(y,wo) and c*(y,w*), in order to decompose the cost 
differential (woTxo - w*Tx*) we need a pair of hypothetical cost frontiers co(y,w*) and c*(y,wo). 
The former describes the best the managers can do with their actual network and the 
consultancy’s ideal input prices, and the latter describes the best the consultancy can do with its 
ideal network and the managers' actual input prices. Since the managers and the consultancy face 
the same output demands, we do not attach a superscript to y in any of the four cost frontiers. 
The four cost frontiers are depicted in Figure 1. The actual cost frontier co(y,wo) is the 
highest, and observed cost woTxo > co(y,wo). The consultancy’s cost frontier c*(y,w*) is the 
lowest, and the consultancy’s cost w*Tx* > c*(y,w*). The two hypothetical cost frontiers 
co(y,w*) and c*(y,wo) are located in the middle, in no particular order. Our objective is to 
decompose the cost differential (woTxo - w*Tx*) in an economically informative way. We have 
two options, as indicated in Decompositions 1 and 2. 
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Decomposition 1. The cost differential (woTxo – w*Tx*) decomposes as 
(woTxo – w*Tx*) = 
 [co(y,wo) – c*(y,wo)]                                             network design differential 
+ [c*(y,wo) – c*(y,w*)]                                                  input price differential 
+ {[woTxo – co(y,wo)] – [w*Tx* - c*(y,w*)]}               cost efficiency differential 
Decomposition 2. The cost differential (woTxo – w*Tx*) also decomposes as 
(woTxo – w*Tx*) = 
[co(y,w*) – c*(y,w*)]                                            network design differential 
+ [co(y,wo) – co(y,w*)]                                                   input price differential 
+ {[woTxo – co(y,wo)] – [w*Tx* - c*(y,w*)]}               cost efficiency differential 
In Figure 1 co(y,wo) = woTxB, c*(y,w*) = w*TxE, c*(y,wo) = woTxF and co(y,w*) = w*TxG. 
Thus the cost decomposition exercise requires invoking Shephard's (1953) lemma to retrieve the 
unobserved cost-efficient input vectors xB = ∇woco(y,wo) and xE = ∇w*c*(y,w*), and either the 
hypothetical input vector xF = ∇woc*(y,wo) in Decomposition 1 or the hypothetical input vector 
x
G
 = ∇w*co(y,w*) in Decomposition 2. 
The two decompositions identify the same three sources of cost difference. The first 
component attributes a portion of the cost differential to differences in network design; the 
consultancy's ideal network may be less costly to operate at either input price vector. The second 
component attributes a portion of the cost differential to input price differences; the consultancy's 
ideal input price vector may lead to lower cost regardless of which distribution network is used. 
The third component attributes the remainder of the cost differential to differences in cost 
efficiency; since the consultancy has simultaneously designed both an ideal network and an ideal 
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input price vector, this combination may be more cost efficient than that of the incumbent 
managers. 
The two decompositions share a common cost efficiency differential, but they have 
different network design and input price differentials because they are based on different 
hypothetical cost frontiers. The first decomposition evaluates the network design differential at 
the managers’ input vector wo, and evaluates the input price differential using the consultancy’s 
network c*(•). The second decomposition evaluates the network design differential at the 
consultancy’s input vector w*, and evaluates the input price differential using the managers’ 
network co(•). 
We expect the two network design differentials to be similar, and the two input price 
differentials to be similar. However the conditions under which c*(y,wo) = co(y,w*) (which 
would make both differentials coincide) are restrictive, and are unlikely to be satisfied 
empirically. Accordingly it is useful to combine the two decompositions and express the 
combination in arithmetic mean form, as indicated in Decomposition 3.10 
Decomposition 3. The cost differential (woTxo – w*Tx*) decomposes in arithmetic mean form as 
(woTxo – w*Tx*) = 
    (1/2){[co(y,wo) - c*(y,wo)] + [co(y,w*) - c*(y,w*)]}    network design differential 
+  (1/2){[c*(y,wo) - c*(y,w*)] + [co(y,wo) - co(y,w*)]}           input price differential 
+ {[woTxo – co(y,wo)] – [w*Tx* - c*(y,w*)]}                      cost efficiency differential 
In contrast to Decompositions 1 and 2, the mean form Decomposition 3 is based on all four 
cost frontiers, and so it requires finding all four unobserved cost-efficient input vectors identified 
in Figure 1 and defined beneath Decomposition 2. However the mean form decomposition has 
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two nice features. As a practical matter, it avoids having to choose between the two hypothetical 
cost frontiers c*(y,wo) and co(y,w*). From a theoretical perspective, its input price differential 
component is the arithmetic mean of a pair of Konüs (1924) input price (or cost of living) 
indexes, one using the managers’ network and the other using the consultancy’s ideal network. 
Thus the mean form decomposition has an attractive theoretical foundation.11,12 
V. The Empirical Technique 
Decomposing the cost differential requires finding the four unobserved cost-efficient input 
vectors (xB,xE,xF,xG), which requires solving four cost minimization problems. We use linear 
programming techniques described in Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985) to do so. The general 
form of these four linear programming problems is 
minx,λ  wiTx 
subject to         yim ≤ Σjλjymj       m = 1,…,M 
 xn ≥ Σjλjxnj         n = 1,…,N 
 λj ≥ 0                 j = 1,…,J 
           Σjλj = 1, 
where the superscript “i” indicates the producer being evaluated and there are J producers in the 
sample. In our application M = 5, N = 5, and J = 68. The production technology constructed by 
the constraints in the program satisfies monotonicity and convexity, and allows for variable 
returns to scale. 
The solution to the problem identifies a cost minimizing input vector for producer i facing 
input prices wi and constrained by best practice technology as established by the constraints in 
the program. When the data are the managers’ data (y,xo,wo), the solution to the problem is xB in 
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Figure 1, and co(y,wo) = woTxB in Decomposition 3. When the data are the consultancy’s data 
(y,x*,w*), the solution to the problem is xE in Figure 1, and c*(y,w*) = w*TxE in Decomposition 
3. The input vector xF in Figure 1, for which c*(y,wo) = woTxF in Decomposition 3, is determined 
as the solution to the problem when the data are (y,x*,wo) and contain the consultancy’s input 
vector and the managers’ input price vector. Finally the input vector xG in Figure 1, for which 
co(y,w*) = w*TxG in Decomposition 3, is determined as the solution to the problem when the data 
are (y,xo,w*) and contain the managers’ input vector and the consultancy’s input price vector. 
Identification of (xB,xE,xF,xG) for each producer in each scenario enables us to implement the 
cost differential decomposition in Decomposition 3.  
VI. The Empirical Findings 
We have solved the four linear programming problems for each of the 68 
distributor/province observations. The solutions to these four sets of problems generate values of 
the four cost-efficient input vectors (xB,xE,xF,xG) required to implement the cost differential 
decomposition in Decomposition 3. Our empirical findings appear in Table 4, which summarizes 
the decomposition by distributor rather than by distributor/province observation.13 
The final three rows of Table 3 demonstrate that the actual network operates at a cost that 
is nearly 300 million euros, or nearly 40%, higher than the cost of operating the consultancy’s 
ideal network. Thus the consultancy’s ideal network has the potential to achieve a 28% cost 
saving. This cost saving is widespread, and applies to the seven largest distributors. It is this 
potential cost saving that we wish to decompose into its constituent sources.   
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Table 4 demonstrates that 69% of the potential cost saving is attributable to the fact that the 
consultancy proposes lower input prices, in the aggregate and for the seven largest distributors. 
49% of the potential cost saving is due to the fact that the consultancy proposes a leaner network, 
in the aggregate and for all nine distributors. Neither of these findings is surprising, since the 
consultancy's engineers were unencumbered by history. The consultancy’s network was designed 
solely on the basis of current and projected future demand, and without the structural constraints 
imposed by past developments, while much of the actual network was built years ago before 
demand evolved to its current level and geographic distribution. It is noteworthy, however, that 
these two sources exceed the total cost saving.  
It follows that the consultancy’s ideal network is not as cost efficient as the actual network. 
This gives the managers a countervailing 18% cost advantage, amounting to 53 million euros, 
over the consultancy. The superior cost efficiency of the actual network is widespread, applying 
to seven of nine distributors. There are at least two plausible explanations for the superior cost 
efficiency of the actual network. First, the consultancy’s network was designed by engineers 
rather than by economists, and while the engineers developed a superior network design, they 
were less concerned with its cost efficiency. With this in mind, Gómez and Pacheco (2000) and 
GERE (2000) have proposed a revision of the engineering procedure used to build the ideal 
network. Second, the standard cost reimbursement scheme allows managers to retain excess 
revenues, and the standard cost parameters have not been adjusted for improvements in 
productivity since 1987. This provides managers with a powerful incentive to be cost efficient. 
Superior allocative efficiency gained through years of managerial experience is the driving 
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source behind both of these explanations, since the two networks have essentially the same 
technical efficiency. 
VII.  Conclusions 
We have exploited an unusual opportunity to benchmark the managers’ performance 
against engineering standards established by an international consultancy. The usual practice is to 
benchmark against best observed practice, because engineering information is rarely available. 
The distinction is important, because the consultancy’s network was designed solely on the basis 
of currently available technology and current and projected future demand, and without the 
structural constraints imposed by outdated technology and past developments, while much of the 
existing network was built years ago before technology advanced and demand evolved to its 
current level and geographic distribution. 
Our actual performance describes the 1996 activities of Spanish electricity distributors, for 
which we have a total of 68 distributor/province observations. Our engineering standards are 
obtained by aggregating detailed information generated by the consultancy to the same 
distributor/province level. 
As expected, we find that the network design differential and the input price differential 
both favor the consultancy's ideal network. However since the ideal network was designed by 
engineers rather than by economists, we also find that the incumbent managers are more cost-
efficient than the consultants because they exploit their incentive to be allocatively efficient 
under the revenue cap regulatory regime. Since the ideal network does not allocate inputs in a 
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cost-efficient manner, we conclude that the consultancy has understated the potential cost savings 
by nearly one-third.  
Nonetheless the consultancy's ideal network has the potential to serve the regulator well, as 
a substitute for yardstick competition in a market supplied by so few distributors that 
implementing yardstick competition would require the introduction of international comparators 
of dubious relevance. We find that the regulator is achieving part of this potential. The regulator 
is using it to justify a reallocation of the aggregate revenue cap among distributors. However 
there is little evidence to suggest that the regulator is also using it to reallocate monopoly rents 
away from distributors toward consumers by setting a positive X so as to reduce the aggregate 
revenue cap.  
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Footnotes 
* Previous versions of this paper have been presented at the Sixth European Workshop on 
Efficiency and Productivity Analysis held at KVL, Copenhagen, Denmark, at Aston Business 
School, Birmingham, UK, and at the Australasian Meetings of the Econometric Society, 
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia. We are grateful to Comisión 
Nacional de la Energía (CNE), Generalitat de Catalunya 200SGR00052, and Dirección General 
de Enseñanza Superior e Investigación Científica, SEC2001-2793-C03-01, for generous financial 
support. We thank Luis Maqueda and Arturo Romero of CNE for their assistance, Peter Bogetoft 
for his guidance, and Steinar Holden and two referees for their constructive comments. 
1. In an academic setting, DEA has been used to investigate the performance of electricity 
distributors in a number of countries, including Norway by Førsund & Kittelsen (1998), and 
Sweden by Hjalmarsson & Veiderpass (1992a,1992b). In a regulatory setting, Agrell & Bogetoft 
(2001) report that DEA has been proposed or is in use in a number of countries. The Norwegian 
and Finnish experiences are described by Kittelsen (1999) and Korhonen and Syrjänen (2002).  
2. Sample sizes are relatively large in Finland, Norway and Sweden, but relatively small in 
Denmark, the Netherlands and New Zealand. In Australia, where regulation is conducted at the 
state level, sample sizes are extremely small, and the inclusion of overseas distributors for 
benchmarking purposes has been controversial; see ESAA (1994), IPART (2001), REGGEN 
(1998) and QCA (1999). 
3. The Swedish Energy Agency (2002) describes the ongoing construction of what it calls a 
“fictitious” grid with which to calculate resource requirements for the efficient distribution of 
electricity at high reliability and reasonable tariffs. Fictitious line lengths and substation 
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capacities are to be combined with cost functions for each part of the grid. This grid is intended 
to provide incentives to the grid companies to operate as effectively as possible, and to provide 
the regulator with a benchmark against which to assess the performance of the grid companies 
and the reasonableness of their tariffs. 
4. Much of the material in this Section is based on discussions with CNE personnel. Arocena, 
Kühn & Regibeau (1999) provide additional information, and Crampes & Laffont (1995) explore 
the relationship of MLE to yardstick competition.  
5. CSEN has been renamed twice since 1994. The present name is “Comisión Nacional de la 
Energía” (CNE). We retain the original name in the paper. CSEN was given a limited role in the 
reform process, with the Ministerio de Industria retaining primary decision-making authority 
until it disappeared after the parliamentary elections of 1999. In its place there is a new ministry. 
6. Since 1998 the regulator has issued an aggregate revenue cap that is divided among the 
electricity distributors. This allocation is based on shares that are, in theory, calculated using the 
ideal network. In fact, they are very close to shares that can be calculated from the information on 
ideal cost in Table 3. But it is unclear how the figure issued by the regulator is calculated. It 
seems that the regulator is using the old revenue cap system to calculate it, but it is difficult to 
say because there is no information about it. As we show in this paper, full implementation of the 
ideal network would generate a significant reduction in the cost of electricity distribution. 
7. Spanish law defines the transmission activity as involving lines transmitting at least 220 KV. 
Our distribution lines distribute no more than 132 KV. However since high voltage substations 
must be capable of transforming voltages above 132KV, we define the first substation input in 
terms of the capacity to transform high voltage (400KV, 220KV or 132KV) to a lower high 
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voltage (132KV, 66KV or 50KV), in terms of the capacity to transform high voltage (132KV, 
66KV, 50KV or 45KV) to medium voltage as defined for lines, and in terms of the capacity to 
transform medium voltage to a lower medium voltage as defined for lines. We define the second 
substation input in terms of the capacity to transform medium voltage to low voltage, both as 
defined for lines. 
8. The one glaring anomaly is x1o > x1* for CSE. According to CNE personnel, this reflects the 
fact that CSE serves Andalusia, where large property developers have installed their own low 
voltage lines. These do not appear in the actual input vector, but they are included in the 
consultancy’s ideal input vector. Although it would be desirable to adjust either x1o or x1*, the 
requisite information is unavailable. 
9. It is worth noting that the standard operating cost of 1,048 million euros we are examining is 
just over one third of standard total cost allocated to the distributors. 
10. It is also possible to express Decomposition 3 in geometric mean form as 
(woTxo / w*Tx*)  =   
{[co(y,wo) / c*(y,wo)] × [co(y,w*) / c*(y,w*)]}1/2        network design ratio 
×  {[c*(y,wo) / c*(y,w*)] × [co(y,wo) / co(y,w*)]}1/2            input price ratio 
× [woTxo / co(y,wo)] / [w*Tx* / c*(y,w*)]                        cost efficiency ratio 
Details and empirical calculations are available on request. 
11. For more on the Konüs price index and related matters, see Balk (1998). 
12. It is also possible to decompose the cost efficiency differential into a technical efficiency 
differential and an allocative efficiency differential. Such a further decomposition has the 
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potential to shed light on the nature of the cost efficiency differential, since cost inefficiency 
decomposes into technical inefficiency (an equiproportionate excess use of all inputs) and 
allocative inefficiency (a misallocation of inputs in light of their respective prices). We do not 
report results of this decomposition, although results are available on request. 
13. Decompositions 1 and 2 produce very similar results, and so the arithmetic mean form 
decomposition in Decomposition 3 is not averaging disparate results. 
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 TABLE 1.  Output Quantities for Spanish Electricity Distributors 
 Electricity Distributors 
 
CSE ENHER ERZ EV FECSA HECSA HC IB UEF 
Y1 Number consumers,LV 3,425,337 1,075,904 646,787 509,957 1,820,524 545,331 485,949 7,804,648 2,639,833 
Y2 Number consumers, MV & 
HV 
6,590 939 2,380 592 1,120 355 525 33,884 7,132 
Y3 Service territory area, Km2 99,616 16,282 43,064 18,432 18,806 5,845 7,565 207,243 69,433 
Y4 LV, MV&HV Electricity 
distributed, GWh 
19,910 10,956 4,420 3,601 14,479 4,008 6,239 53,706 17,367 
Y5 Reliability 523.6 495.2 594.8 826.8 499.1 970.8 1,009.5 1,304.0 426.1 
 
CSE = Compañía Sevillana de Electricidad, S. A. 
ENHER = Energia Nacional Hidroeléctrica del Ribagorzana 
ERZ = Eléctricas Reunidas de Zaragoza, S. A. 
EV = Electra de Viesgo, S. A. 
FECSA = Fuerzas Eléctricas de Cataluña, S. A. 
HECSA = Hidroeléctrica del Cantábrico, S. A. 
HC = Hidroeléctrica del Catanuña, S. A. 
IB = Iberdrola, S. A. 
UEF = Unión Eléctrica Fenosa, S. A. 
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TABLE 2.  Input Quantities for Spanish Electricity Distributors 
 Electricity Distributors 
Actual Inputs 
CSE ENHER ERZ EV FECSA HECSA HC IB UEF 
xO1 LV lines in Km 27,770 15,336 9,001 15,278 27,933 4,739 10,065 100,709 47,133 
xO2 MV lines in Km 35,925 9,920 10,144 7,994 20,406 3,728 4,657 71,924 29,901 
xO3 HV lines in Km 9,135 1,993 3,056 1,741 2,956 1,077 1,214 16,853 6,814 
xO4 Substation transformer capacity: 
HV/HV, HV/MV, MV/MV, in MVA 
19,505 7,636 4,879 3,605 10,247 3,863 3,958 66,042 15,752 
xO5 Substation transformer capacity: 
MV/LV, in MVA 
10,105 4,332 1,566 1,336 6,148 2,100 915 17,206 5,976 
“Ideal” Inputs 
         
x*1 LV lines in Km 48,483 12,694 6,730 9,519 17,355 3,600 8,184 94,288 39,769 
x*2 MV lines in Km 32,602 6,454 9,259 7,183 8,644 2,837 6,673 67,549 30,412 
x*3 HV lines in Km 6,046 1,143 2,574 828 1,131 399 620 13,748 4,232 
x*4 Substation transformer capacity: 
HV/HV, HV/MV, MV/MV, in MVA 
15,218 6,654 5,597 2,809 12,194 3,747 3,406 45,501 16,125 
x*5 Substation transformer capacity: 
MV/LV, in MVA 
6,892 2,672 1,525 1,012 4,949 1,403 1,030 16,225 5,857 
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TABLE 3.  Input Prices and Total Operating Cost for Spanish Electricity Distributors 
 Electricity Distributors 
Actual Input Prices CSE ENHER ERZ EV FECSA HECSA HC IB UEF  
wO1 euros by Km LV 1,689 1,198 638 282 709 1,231 546 890 739  
wO2 euros by Km MV 976 1,164 552 446 803 1,426 1,044 980 878  
wO3 euros by Km HV 1,063 1,127 1,040 1,089 1,248 1,224 981 1,080 1,140  
wO4 euros by MVA 2,058 2,639 3,413 2,490 2,675 2,954 1,468 2,402 2,717  
wO5 euros by MVA 3,739 4,515 3,812 3,525 5,766 5,714 5,856 5,610 5,730  
“Ideal” Input Prices           
w*1 euros by Km LV 883 955 943 721 883 1,039 920 894 875  
w*2 euros by Km MV 1,542 1,549 1,596 1,521 1,523 1,587 1,673 1,538 1,510  
w*3 euros by Km HV 1,789 1,773 1,737 1,731 1,791 1,811 1,874 1,757 1,700  
w*4 euros by MVA 842 814 861 800 832 678 524 789 654  
w*5 euros by MVA 3,379 3,061 3,488 5,245 3,497 3,344 4,833 3,270 3,649  
Total Operating Cost               
(millions euros) 
CSE ENHER ERZ EV FECSA HECSA HC IB UEF TOTAL 
Actual Cost = wOxO 162.9 76.8 39.4 21.8 118.8 38.9 22.7 423.5 143.4 1,048.2 
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“Ideal” Cost = w*x* 139.5 37.9 34.9 26.7 57.3 17.0 26.6 296.2 113.8 749.9 
wOxO - w*x*  23.4 38.9 4.4 -4.8 61.5 21.9 -3.9 127.3 29.6 298.3 
TABLE 4.  Cost Differential Decomposition for Spanish Electricity Distributors (million euros) 
Electricity 
Distributors 
Number of 
Provinces wOxO - w*x* = 
 Network 
Design 
Differential 
+ 
Input Price 
Differential 
+ 
Cost 
Efficiency 
Differential 
= 
Actual Cost 
Inefficiency 
"Ideal" 
Cost 
Inefficiency 
CSE 9 23.4  13.8  26.0  -16.4  21.6 38.0 
ENHER 7 38.9  14.7  20.6  3.6  9.4 5.8 
ERZ 4 4.4  4.2  2.3  -2.1  2.4 4.6 
EV 5 -4.8  3.1  -5.0  -2.9  8.0 10.9 
FECSA 4 61.5  27.6  34.1  -0.2  11.4 11.6 
HECSA 4 21.9  7.3  10.7  4.0  7.3 3.4 
HC 1 -3.9  1.9  -0.9  -4.9  0.0 4.9 
IB 25 127.3  50.9  89.8  -13.4  25.2 38.6 
UEF 9 29.6  22.0  28.3  -20.7  17.4 38.2 
TOTAL 68 298.3  145.5  205.9  -53.1  102.7 155.9 
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Figure 1.  The Cost Decomposition Framework 
 
